

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00

OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05 BIB-01 ISO-00

CU-02 /079 W

----- 055041

R 071447Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9975

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 6310

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

USIA FOR IBS, IEE, IPS

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET POLICY AFTER CSCE

REF: A) MOSCOW 5822; B) GENEVA 3061

1. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE USDEL CSCE'S COMMENTS ON OUR CABLE ON SOVIET POST-CSCE POLICY (REFTELS) AND WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH ON TWO OF THE POINTS MENTIONED, WHICH WE DID NOT TREAT IN DETAIL.

2. OUR CABLE (PARA 11) ARGUED AGAINST USING AN UNCERTAIN SITUATION IN PORTUGAL TO DELAY A CSCE CONCLUSION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS COULD WELL HARDEN SOVIET POLICY IN WAYS ANTITHETICAL TO WESTERN INTERESTS. WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE EFFECT ON SOVIET POLICY OF A POSSIBILITY RAISED BY USMISSION GENEVA: A DELAY OF STAGE THREE STEMMING FROM REASONS DIRECTLY RELATED TO CSCE ITSELF (E.G., CONTINUING LOGGERHEADS OVER BASKET THREE AND/OR CBM'S). IN SUCH A CASE, WE WOULD BE MUCH LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON SOVIET POLICY, SINCE MOSCOW WOULD KNOW IT COULD GET A CSCE CONCLUSION VIA A FEW KEY CONCESSIONS ON ISSUES ON WHICH THE WESTERN POSITION HAS BEEN CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE CONFERENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARGUE, EITHER TO US OR TO THEMSELVES, THAT THE WEST WAS DRAGGING IN EXTRANEIOUS FACTORS AT THE LAST MINUTE. THUS, WE AGREE WITH USDEL'S CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE MADE TO WORK FOR THE TIMING (AND THE LEVEL) THAT THEY WANT. WE TRUST THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE DOING THIS IN A WAY WHICH WILL DENY THE SOVIETS ANY VALID REASON FOR CHARGING THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS HARDER THAN THAT OF ITS ALLIES. (NATURALLY, THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, CAN BE EXPECTED TO COMPLAIN THAT THE U.S. IS NOT DISCHARGING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN BRINGING ITS ALLIES AROUND; BUT THIS NEED NOT CONCERN US UNDULY.)

3. WE DID NOT MENTION CBM'S IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOVIET EMPHASIS ON MILITARY DETENTE (OUR PARA 5) BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION OF CBM'S  
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WILL BE AS GRUDGING AFTER CSCE AS THEIR APPROACH HAS BEEN NEGATIVE DURING IT. WHILE THERE MAY BE SOME REHTORICAL SOVIET OBEISSANCE TO THE VALUE OF CBM'S, WE DOUBT THAT EVEN THIS WILL BE COUCHED IN ANY BUT THE MOST GENERAL TERMS. THE INTENSITY WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS INSIST ON LANGUAGE ON THE VOLUNTARY BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS INDICATES THE DEPTH OF CONCERN WITH WHICH THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT VIEWS CBM'S. IN SUM, WE FIND IT

HARD TO IMAGINE THAT CBM'S WILL PLAY ANYTHING BUT THE  
MOST MINISCULE ROLE IN THE EXPECTED POST-CSCE SOVIET  
CAMPAIGN TO TOUT MILITARY DETENTE.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Concepts:** FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 07 MAY 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
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**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
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**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
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**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
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**TAGS:** PFOR, UR, CSCE  
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